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With this contribution, we offer a perspective focused on the mind-body relation in a specific
phase of the life span: adolescence. In particular, we look at the complexity of some of the
processes involved in the construction of an adult Self, which results from the interaction between
experiences from infancy and a changing body during adolescence accompanied by implemented
mental and social abilities/possibilities. Our interpretative hypothesis goes back to the construct
of mentalization, focusing on the function of implicit bodily memories entwined with infantile
experiences as precursors of relational dynamics that are mentalistically mediated. When troubled,
these need to be dealt with, particularly during adolescence, when the demanding and inedited
quests of the body may represent a hurdle that has to be overcome to achieve the formation of an
integrated identity.
The development of cognition, the complexity of behavioral and social processes and, not last,
sexual maturationmark adolescence (e.g., Camaioni andDi Blasio, 2007; Faliva and Cozzani, 2011),
defined as period “in transition” (Rutter, 1992; Palmonari, 1997). The individual develops a sense
of self from infancy; however, during adolescence the very first conscious effort is made to answer
to the question “Who am I?.” This involves the organization of the individual’s abilities, beliefs
and history with the aim to form a coherent image of the Self through a sense of continuity over
time (Pasupathi and Hoyt, 2009). In this stage, beliefs about the Self as well as beliefs of others are
integrated within the process of identity development, which requires reaching a balance between
commitment and confusion about one’s beliefs, goals, values, and roles in society (Erikson, 1963).
When commitment occurs, possibly after exploration of different alternatives, the adolescent can
effectively resolve the identity issue dodging a chance to remain in a state of “identity diffusion”
characterized by absence of integration and lack of commitment (Makros and McCabe, 2001).
This scenario is further challenged by changes occurring in the adolescent’s social cognitive and
emotional brain, which significantly affect social behavior and choices during adolescence and,
namely, the process of “social reorientation” (Nelson et al., 2005; see also Immordino-Yang, 2016).
Within this complex frame, adolescents are conventionally thought to build their identity
hinging psychic with social (e.g., Erikson, 1950, 1953), very much in line with Mead’s general
conception of Self-construction (Mead, 1913). Less attention has been paid to maturation of the
body, the first biological marker of our lifelong experiences. In fact, as thoroughly argued by
several authors below discussed, in the transition from primary to tertiary intersubjectivity, the
individual’s transforming body and brain grow in active engagement with an environment of
human factors—organic at first, then psychological or inter-mental (Trevarthen and Hubley, 1978;
Trevarthen and Aitken, 2001; see also, Stern, 1985, 2004; Seganti, 1995).
Let’s try then to reverse the classical view placing the body at the “forefront.” The body is from
birth (and even from the uterus) a constructive and expressive vehicle of the Self. Not by chance, it
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has been suggested to add the body to the four levels of Doise’s
psychosocial analysis (Doise, 1982, Doise and Mapstone, 1986;
Brunel and Cosnier, 2012). Then, how do we enquire the body
to support the construction of an identity, the developmental
transition from infancy to subsequent epochs, ferrying through
adolescence? A plausible approach is to look at what happens
when things “go wrong.” It is emblematic that adolescents
choose the body to express their discomfort: the developmental
impasse in shaping the Self is explicit through injury of one’s
own body that—even if within dynamics involving different
etiopathogenetic factors—represents a glaring example of how
ruptures in developmental milestones carry effects through from
infancy to childhood, ultimately reflecting on the adolescents’
incapacity to manage all the dynamics underpinning their
balanced maturation (Sempio Liverta et al., 2005; Midgley and
Vrouva, 2012;Marchetti and Cavalli, 2013;Marchetti et al., 2013).
In this respect, the capacity to mentalize represents a critical
forerunner of the teen’ perception of the physical Self, as well as
of decisions taken with respect to their body. During the child’s
development, mentalization implies a gradual acquisition of the
ability to correctly attribute mental states to oneself and others
to understand behaviors, a maturation of reflective processes
regarding people’s internal states (Fonagy and Target, 2003; Allen
and Fonagy, 2006). Mentalization is a construct that primarily
origins from clinical studies and that—more than the construct
of Theory of Mind, which mainly refers to an ability—implies
one’s propensity to look at social events in terms of mental states.
It follows that, wherever mentalization fails, repercussions of
different types and degrees can be observed affecting the child’s
behavior before, and the adolescent’s psychological and physical
integrity after, in a continuum between typical and atypical
development.
Now, how can we approach mentalization failures that, as
hypothesized initially, may be also tied to implicit, bodily rooted,
memories shaped by infantile experiences? Moreover, assuming
these dynamics entrenched in the adolescent’s current perception
of the Self, how can the teen’s identification process be redirected
and reinstated?
To leave something behind, it needs to be somehow
remembered; to leave infancy, one needs to be able to disclose
it. One of the most frequent and powerful human activities
in which this process can take place is narrative: there seems
to be no other way of “describing "lived time" save in the
form of a narrative,” a selective achievement of memory recall
(Bruner, 2004, p. 692; see also Ricoeur, 1981; Nelson, 1989).
For Bruner, narrative - as approached from a constructivist view
intended as the mind “making the world”—encloses the sense
of Self, one’s autobiographical history (Bruner, 2004), which
inevitably binds to who we are here and now and to what we
carry around from our culture (see, e.g., Bruner, 1987, 1991,
2014). Relating mentalization and narrative, years of research on
narrative (e.g., Feeney et al., 1994; Fonagy et al., 1998; see also,
Van IJzendoorn and Bakermans-Kranenburg, 2008; George and
West, 2012; Rossouw and Fonagy, 2012) emphasize on the idea
that early experiences with primary caregivers are internalized
and eventually reflected in the adults’ self-narratives (Waters
et al., 2017), which are to be viewed not as a record of what
“actually happened” but rather as a continuing reinterpretation
of one’s experiences (Bruner, 2004). Seen from this perspective,
one can then muster the use of memory through narration—
regarded in this light as mentalization means—to build a sense
of continuity against threats of identity fragmentation. Narrative-
based practices would then emerge as an effective strategy helping
teenagers found on infantile narratives an “upgraded” narrative
accounting for the new personal resources and social quests. It
is clear that this process does not imply denying or forgetting
the past identity, but rather its integration—within one’s own
personality—with the new emerging identity.
But what narrative and which forms of memory are
to be used that will not betray what said here at the
beginning, and namely that the bridge that the mind needs
to cross to reach the adult land is the body? From very
early in life, the child is seen as an individual able to
continuously self-regulate (e.g., Tronick, 1982, 1989; Stern,
1985). A cognitive-affective system of attachment emerges,
able to continuously monitor the surrounding environment
and endowing the child with procedural knowledge of his
internal states with respect to relational events. These procedures
incorporate, according to the “sensory memory of attachment
relationships” (Seganti, 1995), information regarding the body
recorded as sequences of activation states. Any attempt
by the child to establish and maintain a balance between
his/her internal system and the interaction with the caregiver
would determine behavioral modifications persisting in memory
(Tronick, 1989) that translate, in the adult life, in a bodily
“unconscious/intuitive” response to the environmental stimuli
(Seganti, 1995).
Also Stern (1985, 2000, 2004) supported the idea that the
transmodal diffusion of the activation levels persist in the
adult as a continuous source of extra-linguistic, non-verbal,
evaluation of the interactive states with the others, which
unfolds in parallel with language production. Language forces
the individual’s perceptual experience within categories, selecting
only some parts of that conglomerate of sensations, perception,
and cognition that, on the other hand, keeps substantiating
the global non-verbal experience of our relations with the
world, most of the times bodily-mediated (see, Werner and
Kaplan, 1963). So-called “instinctive” behaviors may then stem
from an evaluation of reality based on unconscious procedural
memory liable to maintain an active and coherent Self in typical
development. What Seganti (1995) refers to as the process of
bootstrapping that can be then found in cognitive models of
sensorial data, like the Parallel Distributed Processing (e.g.,
Bucci, 1984; Rumelhart and Mcclelland, 1986; Kihlstrom, 1987),
relates to how information associated with the experience of
one’s body—alive and active—would be recorded in the adult’s
memory not only in a verbal format, but also in the form of
anticipatory sequences of activation states (from the viscera).
This idea recalls Damasio’s debated proposal of somatic markers
(Damasio et al., 1996), according to which signals would
arise in bioregulatory processes as related to the body-state
structure and to the brain representation of the body leading
to, for example, undeliberated inhibition of responses learned
previously (Damasio et al., 1996).
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Within this scenario, the hard work that narration should
undertake stems from the compromise between similarities
and oppositions between the sensorial memory of relations—or
bodily memory—and the present interactional context with
the purpose to adequate one’s own involvement to the new
relational situation in a continuous, fast and effective manner
(see, Seganti, 1995). This would allow individuals to re-establish
healthy bridging with their past (see also, Bucci, 1998). Through
narratives, it is therefore possible—both in daily life and in
therapeutic settings (even though with different modalities and
pervasiveness)—to access to unconscious defensive processes and
distress-related memories encapsulated and intertwined in our
mind and body. Once surfaced, they can be reflected upon and
reconstructed by ascribing new meanings and understanding
to past events (McAdams, 1993, 1998). Looking specifically
at adolescence, the capacity to think about one’s own mind,
so painstakingly built during infancy, is now put to test and,
wherever specific deficiencies are present, they now come
to light, pushing the adolescent into a painful and harmful
circuit that can result in real psychological problems. A good
capacity to mentalize can help the adolescent handle difficult
situations avoiding persistent discomfort and maladjustment. In
this sense, intervening timely and precociously on risk factors
can sensibly impinge upon the way in which young women and
men will resolve past situations to face a more serene future.
Bodily and representational have to be melded together, both
conceptually and with respect to prevention and rehabilitation
measures suited to aid adolescents in distress, fruitfully adjoining
concepts like internal working models of attachment, the
“procedural and sensorial memory of relationships,” narrative
as intended by Bruner, and the concept of Stern’s “present
moment, now” (Stern, 2004) as non-verbal means of psychic
transformation.
Lastly, while we here made an attempt to outline the role
of the body as a carrier of implicit memories strongly affecting
behavior over development—from childhood to adulthood
passing through the winding road of adolescence—we would
like to ultimately bring forward not only the role of one’s own
body, but rather of the individual’s body in relation to the
others’ minds and, mostly, to the others’ bodies. For all the
matters here addressed, this is particularly relevant when dealing
with adolescence. The need emerges preponderant to reflect on
theoretical models, educational and clinical at once, in which
one’s own body is regarded in relation to the others’ bodies as
a regulative system of the Self. The selection of our partners,
friends, and the relational circle in general is no coincidence.
Relationships do not develop only on the basis of a meeting of
minds but also—and perhaps primarily and at a deeper implicit
level—on recognition and synchronization dynamics, which are
in our opinion bodily grounded.
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